Richard R. Black, Patricia Black v. Dr. James S. Boyce : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Richard R. Black, Patricia Black v. Dr. James S.
Boyce : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs and Jeffs; Attorney for Appellants.
Clair M Aldrich; Aldrich and Nelson; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Black v. Boyce, No. 14358.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1454
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45,9 
.S9 
DOCKETN 
UTW SUPREME COUR: 
BRIEF ^ _ 
*„ ;OURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R. BLACK, D.D.S. and 
PATRICIA BLACK, his wife, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
DR. JAMES S. BOYCE, ) 
) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP 1 5 1976 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Case No. 14358 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
On appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CLAIR M. ALDRICH 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
F I L E D 
APR 8 la'/b 
Clark, Supreme Court, Utth Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . 1 
ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EXHIBIT 8 IN EVIDENCE AND IN CONCLUDING 
FROM ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF DID RECEIVE 
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT 3 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF NEVER AT ANY TIME TENDERED PAYMENT TO CURE 
THE DEFAULT, NOR EVER TENDERED FULL PAYMENT OF THE 
OBLIGATION TO DEFENDANT 5 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY RULING THAT 
THE DEFAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDED RECOVERY OF 
DAMAGES FROM DEFENDANT 5 
POINT IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT 6 
POINT V. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS FULLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 8 
CONCLUSION . . 9 
Cases Cited 
Brown v. Fraternal Accident Assn., 18 Utah 265, 55 Pac.63.. 4 
Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah(2) 399, 438 P(2) 813 6 
Williamson v. Wanless, (Jan.30,1976) Utah, 545 P(2) 1145... 6 
Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah(2) 231, 500 P(2) 1007 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statutes Cited 
70A-10-101, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 5 
70A-10-102(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 5 
Reference Works 
91 ALR 161, at page 114 4 
17 Am Jur (2) 884 5 
17 Am Jur (2) paragraph 441, page 898 6 
Restatement of Contracts, paragraphs 280, 306 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R. BLACK, D.D.S. and ) 
PATRICIA BLACK, his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ) 
) 
-vs- ) Case No. 14 353 
) 
DR. JAMES S. BOYCE, ) 
) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs sued defendant for damages for an alleged 
breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to the Court and the Court entered 
its judgment in favor of defenaant and against the plaintiffs, 
no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial 
Court affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 5, 1964, the plaintiffs and defendant entered 
into an agreement whereby defendant was to sell to plaintiff, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard R. Black, thirty (30) shares of common stock in a 
corporation known as "Orem Professional Plaza, Inc.", for 
the sum of $334 3.20, payable in sixty (60) monthly install-
ments of $55.72 each, commencing on July 20, 1964. The name 
and address of the purchaser was shown on the "Installment 
Note", which contained the agreement. (Ex. 2). 
On July 7, 1967, the plaintiff purchaser was in 
default on his payments and because of the hassle defendant 
had gone through in trying to collect his money (Tr. 18) he 
wrote plaintiff, at the address given on the agreement, stat-
ing that he wanted the balance due paid to him within ten (10) 
days, and that if he did not hear from plaintiff within that 
time he would offer the stock to the other members of Orem 
Professional Plaza, Inc. for the balance owing on the note. 
(Ex. 8) . The defendant personally saw that the letter wais 
picked up at his office by the postman, (Tr. 19) and said 
letter was never returned to him. (Tr. 18). 
Defendant heard nothing from plaintiff in response 
to his letter and on August 7, 1967, he sold the stock to Dr. 
Aired and LaGeorge Music Company for the difference between 
what plaintiff had paid and what he still owed on the note, 
(Tr. 15, 16) with the understanding that the plaintiff could 
purchase the shares from them within a reasonable time. (Tr. 17). 
Plaintiff denied having received defendant's letter 
of July 7, 1967. (Tr. 29). However, plaintiff stated that 
he called the defendant in December of 1967 to "ask if he still 
had my stock". (Tr. 25). 
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In December, 1967, plaintiff sent defendant a check 
for two payments in the amount of $111,76, and defendant 
either deposited the money or tried to cash the check with 
the intention of paying the money over to Dr. Aired in behalf 
of plaintiff, but the check was returned marked "insufficient 
funds", and defendant did nothing else about it. (Tr.12). 
Had that check been paid it would not have made plaintiff 
current on his contract. (Tr.31). 
Plaintiff sold his original thirty (30) shares in 
the corporation to LaGeorge Music Company, who thereafter 
occupied plaintiff's original space in the building, (Tr.23) 
and in 1968 plaintiff delivered that stock to the music 
company for a price of $5000.00. (Tr.30). 
Plaintiff never made any effort to pay defendant the 
balance due and owing for the stock. (Tr.38). 
Shortly after August 27, 1967, the plaintiff was told 
by Molly Aired that she was holding the Boyce stock and that 
he could redeem it if he co wished. (Tr.47). Until the 15th 
of November, 19 68, the plaintiff could have obtained the 
defendant's stock by paying the balance due. (Tr.50, 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR IN 
ADMITTING EXHIBIT 8 IN EVIDENCE AND IN CONCLUD-
ING FROM ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF DID 
RECEIVE NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT. 
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The letter in question was addressed to Richard R. 
Black at 291 South State, Orem, Utah. On the agreement of 
the parties Richard R. Black at that same address was shown as 
the purchaser. (Ex.2). There was positive testimony that the 
postman took the letter. (Tr.19). The letter was never re-
turned to the sender. (Tr.19). Plaintiff denied having re-
ceived the letter. 
The question whether or not the rebutting evidence 
is sufficient to overcome the presumption of receipt has 
generally been held to be one for the jury to determine in the 
particular case. 91 ALR 161, at page 114. In Brown v. Fraternal 
Accident Assn., 18 Utah 265, 55 Pac. 63, the Supreme Court of 
Utah ruled that the addressee's secretary's denial of receipt 
of the letter raised a conflict of evidence and presented a 
question for the jury to determine. 
In this case there was other evidence that supported 
the trial court's conclusion that the letter was received. If 
the plaintiff did not receive the letter why would he call 
defendant to ask him if he still had the stock? Why would he 
ask Molly Aired if she had Dr. Boyce's stock? 
The Court should also note the language in plain-
tiff's Exhibit 6, a letter from plaintiff to defendant in Dec-
ember of 1967 - "Try to stay healthy Jim - the world is full 
of vultures". 
The trial Court had an opportunity to observe and 
hear the witnesses and his conclusion that the letter was 
-4-
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received is supported by competent evidence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF NEVER AT ANY TIME TENDERED PAYMENT 
TO CURE THE DEFAULT, NOR EVER TENDERED FULL 
PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION TO DEFENDANT. 
References by appellants in their Brief to the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code are inapplicable in this case. 
The effective date for that statute (Title 70A) was 
midnight, December 31, 1965, and it applied only to trans-
actions entered into after that date. (Title 70A-10-101 and 
70A-10-102(2), Utah Code Annotated, as amended.) In the 
instant case there is no dispute but that the plaintiff and 
defendant entered into their transaction in June of 1964. 
(Ex.2). 
Appellants cite no other authority. 
As a general proposition, the failure of one party 
to an entire contract to pay an installment when due is such 
a breach as will absolve the other party from all obligation 
to perform while the default continues. 17 Am Jur(2) 8 84; 
Restatement of Contracts, paragraphs 280, 306. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY RULING THAT THE 
DEFAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF PRECLUDED RECOVERY OF 
DAMAGES FROM DEFENDANT. 
A party who seeks to recover damages from the other 
party to a contract for a breach must show that he, himself, 
is free from fault in respect to performance of a dependent 
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promise, or counter-promise, or a condition precedent. 17 
Am Jur(2) paragraph 441, page 898. 
The authorities cited by appellants relate to a 
situation where a plaintiff, himself, is not in default. 
Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah(2) 399, 438 P(2) 813, 
involved the question of recession based on fraud or misre-
presentation. Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Utah(2) 231, 500 
P(2) 1007, involved a summary judgment and the court on 
appeal held that there was a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the seller was required to give buyer thirty days 
notice to remedy a default and the case was remanded for 
trial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff admits he was in default in the amount 
of at least $65.98, which is more than one monthly payment. 
In Williamson v. Wanless, (Jan.30, 1976) Utah,545 
P(2) 1145, every payment due including those up to the date 
of trial, had been tendered to the plaintiffs or to their 
attorney. In addition, that case arose under a 1971 agree-
ment which made it subject to the Uniform Commercial Code 
provisions. 
In this case the plaintiff was not treated harshly. 
The defendant's letter to plaintiff is as follows: (Ex.8) 
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"July 7, 1967 
Dr. Richard R. Black 
291 South State 
Orem, Utah 
Dear Dick: 
I have written you several times recently and 
you have ignored any reply. As per the terms 
of the contract I am asking that the balance 
of the note be paid in full in 10 days. If 
you do not reply I will offer the stock you 
contracted for to the other members of the 
Orem Prof. Plaza, Inc. for the balance owing 
on the note. 
Very truly yours, 
James S. Boyce, D.D.S." 
(Underscoring supplied) 
The defendant waited one month during which time 
he heard nothing whatever from the plaintiff. On August 7, 
19 67, he sold the stock for the balance due on the note to 
the other members of the Orem Professional Plaza Corporation 
with the understanding that the plaintiff could redeem the 
stock from them. The plaintiff was told in November of 
1967 by Molly Aired that she held the stock and that he 
could redeem it. 
The payment of some $111.00 he sent to the defen-
dant in December of 1967, would not have brought him current 
and in any event that check was returned by the bank marked 
"insufficient funds". 
The plaintiff in this case never tendered the money 
to bring his contract current nor has he ever offered to pay 
the balance due on the note even to this time. 
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There is evidence that would support a conclusion 
that the plaintiff couldn't meet his obligations at that 
time. On November 30, 1967, he was delinquent for the months 
of June, July, September, October, and November for the rent 
on the premises where he had his dental office. (Plaintiffs1 
Ex. 9). 
POINT V 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The letter that the plaintiff received from an attor-
ney in behalf of his landlord was not an eviction notice and 
it had absolutely nothing to do with the purchase of the 
stock. That letter, Exhibit 9, gave him the alternative of 
paying his delinquent rent or to vacate. 
The reason nothing was done about the check plaiin-
tiff mailed to defendant in December of 19 67, was because 
that check was not honored by the bank and was returned 
marked "insufficient funds". 
The City of Orem was not a "boom town" in 196 7, nor 
was land going for premium prices at that time. About that 
time the plaintiff in this action sold his one-third interest 
in the corporation for a mere $5000.00. The property boom 
started in 1969, about the time plaintiff filed his lawsuit 
in this case. 
Since the plaintiff was in default, has at all times 
remained in default, and has never yet even tendered perfor-
mance on his own part, there is just no way that he could be 
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entitled to damages against the defendant. 
Even if the plaintiff could establish his right to 
damages there is absolutely no evidence upon which an award 
of damages could be made. This case involved a minority 
interest in a corporation. The plaintiffs estimate or opinion 
that the land the corporation owned was worth $100,000.00 
without a showing of how much the corporation owed, could 
certainly not be a basis for any kind of an award. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial Court is supported by com-
petent evidence, is not contrary to law, and should be affirmed 
by the Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLAIR M. ALDRICH 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah «4601 
Tel: 373-4912 
Attorneys for Defendant - Respondent 
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